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INTRODUCTION
James Buchanan has argued persuasively that social scientists who draw
conclusions outside of their theories' behavioral domains must exercise care to
maintain theoretical consistency.' In a 1972 essay Buchanan contended that
the traditional economic model could predict the reactions of the private sec-
tor to public-policy decisions but, when properly applied, treated public policy
as truly external to its domain, that is, as a variable whose values it could posit
but not predict. Before the model can have implications for the public sector,
he reasoned, economists have to close this open end by drawing the public
sector into the model's predictive domain. By making statements about
public-sector behavior before encompassing it in their theory, economists
create theoretical inconsistencies, such as the expectation that selfless, omni-
scient (if not angelic) government planners can correct the market failures
attending the self-interested behavior of private economic agents. In their
failure to close their behavioral system, post-Pigouvian economists have, in
Buchanan's view, committed the blunder of implying that when individuals
shift nominal roles (from private man to G-man) they also shift behavioral
gears. Any theoretical enterprise seeking to determine the operating charac-
teristics of alternative decisionmaking arrangements must thus work with a
closed theory-a theory that encompasses all of the decisionmakers involved.
A concern with closed behavioral systems is appropriate to the discussion
of alternative legal arrangements and, in particular, alternative liability sys-
tems, for it focuses attention on comparative questions-on the opportunity
costs of switching from one structure of incentives to another, on anticipated
behavioral changes, and on macro- and micro-consequences of these antici-
pated changes. I am impressed by Mashaw's attempt to examine the operating
characteristics of alternative liability arrangements for government officers.'
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
His realistic inquiry into the anticipated behavioral responses of public and
private actors to some form of civil liability and his less than sanguine apprais-
al of liability systems for government officers are generally sensible. He cor-
rectly asserts that "a discussion of the various elements of the existing controls
on official conduct suggests that the weakness of these controls is perhaps the
strongest argument for the use of civil damages."3 He cannot, however, un-
qualifiedly endorse any change in the system of civil liability4 for at least three
reasons:
1. For some classes of harm-especially harms inflicted by police or
affecting constitutional rights-immunity defenses by government
officers or their agents are no longer compelling in the eyes of the
courts; in these areas, at least, some form of liability system is already
in operation.
2. In many areas of government the proposed cure of civil liability
for tortious acts by government officers may be worse than the dis-
ease; an argument for "appropriate incentives for efficient care,"
5
or even for a level of care more efficient than that under official im-
munity, is hard to sustain.
3. Related to (1) and (2) above, and especially compelling to me, is
the observation that civil-liability incentives may operate in different
ways, varying in their effects with the class of act to which they are
applied; any general and uniform conclusion about civil liability, then,
is bound to be crude and often wide of the mark.
In this brief commentary I assume that other commentators will address
some of the challenging legal and economic questions raised by a system of
civil liability for government officers. I differentiate my product by donning
my statistician/decision-theorist cap in order to explore the idea of bureaucra-
tic error. I argue that in the political environments of most government
bureaus error is inevitable, in the sense that the technology of bureaucratic
decisionmaking is so primitive that someone's interests are bound to be er-
roneously injured. In these circumstances perhaps the only salutary effect of
civil liability is compensation for injured parties; the more important effect of
providing appropriate incentives for efficient care may only be slight.
WHAT ARE BUREAUCRATIC ERRORS, AND SHOULD
BUREAUCRATS BE LIABLE FOR THEM?
Bureaucratic decisionmaking errors, like judgmental errors from any other
source, are errors of specification and inference. Consider a set D = [di, d2,
3. Id. at 23.
4. See id. at 10.
5. See id. at 23.
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. . . ., ] of possible decisions by a bureau, one element di of which will be
chosen depending on which of s states of nature 0 = [01, 02 . .. 08] is judged
to prevail. To keep matters simple, suppose that once 0j is known, a unique
decision in D-call itf(0j)-is determined; that is,f: 0 -- D.
A. Potential Sources of Error
Conceptualizing the bureau decision problem in this fashion highlights
three potential sources of error at the outset:
1. Has D Been Correctly Specified?
D is the set of decisions available to the bureau, as subjectively perceived
by the bureau. This set is constrained by the law; but it is not uniquely deter-
mined by the law. Two kinds of specification errors are thus conceivable.
First, the bureau may erroneously include an element-say d*-in D in
contravention of the legal constraints. Legal constraints, after all, are neither
self-activating nor self-defining. The bureau's interpretation and judgment of
them may be in error (that is, at odds with what an authoritative interpreter
of legal constraints might ultimately rule). Second, the bureau may errone-
ously fail to include an element-say d**-in D, perhaps because of lack of
imagination or lack of incentive, even though d** is within the legal restric-
tions on the bureau's discretion and, for some particular state of nature (say
0**), may be the correct choice; i.e., d** =f (0*).
2. Has 0 Been Correctly Characterized?
0 is the set of states of nature or contingencies that a bureau might face.
There are three kinds of error-the two specification errors mentioned above
and a parameterization error. First, a state 0* might be included in the set 0
even though it is impossible. Since no decision will be made on the basis of
observing an impossible state, this is an inconsequential error, unless the
bureau's decision procedures are arranged in light of the mistaken belief that
0* could occur. If ultimate decisions are prejudiced by this mistaken belief,
then an error would have been committed.
Second, a possible state 0"* may have been excluded from 0 (i.e., believed
to be impossible). It is hard to imagine what action a bureau might take upon
observing 0"*, since its decision procedure,f, is not prepared to map 0* onto
an element in D. It is conceivable, however, that because the bureau is ill
prepared to arrive at a decision in the contingency 0"*, it is also ill prepared
to observe 0"* at all. That is, like the economist who is not prepared to
acknowledge an upward-sloping demand curve for normal economic goods,
the bureau may refuse to acknowledge 0** and misperceive it as something
else; or it may delay making any decision (which is itself a decision) and pro-
ceed to "do more research." Both delay and misperception are decisionmak-
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ing responses (if not errors) that are laden with economic consequences.
Third, the set 0 may be improperly parameterized. A parameterization of
the states of nature is a partition of contingencies into categories. The func-
tion f then attaches a decision d E D to each category. The goal of the parti-
tion is to categorize contingencies into homogeneous groups. Inappropriate
partitions are those that are too crude or too fine. The former is the more
serious, since it lumps relevantly dissimilar contingencies into the same categ-
ory, thus erroneously requiring (via J) the same decision for different cir-
cumstances. The latter separates similar circumstances into different
categories. Iff dictates that the decision is the same for each of the categories
into which these similar circumstances have been separated-e.g., f(Oi) =
f(0j)-then no damage has been done, though some informational inefficiency
in decisionmaking is indicated. If, however, f requires different decisions,
then an error has been committed in at least one instance. Parameterization
problems, in sum, are violations of equal protection.
3. Is the Decision Rule f Appropriate?
The decision rule f specifies the relationship between contingencies and
decisions. It represents the intellectual commitments, information collection
processes, and internal decisionmaking procedures that convert an observa-
tion into a decision. Erroneous judgment can occur in any of these areas. New
discoveries occasionally require the reexamination of previous intellectual
commitments. Indeed, many sociologists of knowledge have substantiated the
notion that intellectual commitments often survive long after they are out-of-
date. Information collection processes may provide peculiar or perverse incen-
tives which bias the information collected; for example, the difficulty of elicit-
ing accurate revelations of preference for various public goods is well known.
Finally, even if a bureau's models of cause and effect are valid and its infor-
mation accurate, its decisionmaking procedures may neutralize either of them.
Consider, for example, a hierarchical bureau that is decentralized according
to the tasks that are prerequisite to a decision. Because of the information loss
that accompanies the transmission of information and judgments from lower
levels of the hierarchy to higher levels, the penultimate basis for a decision
may be misleading at best and erroneous at worst.
What this discussion suggests is that errors in decisionmaking-errors that
inflict harm on some and confer benefits on others-are a constant prospect.
The issues that must be examined in weighing official immunity from liability
against some form of civil liability for government officers involve the impact
(if any) that each system of incentives has on the reduction of the various
kinds of error described above and on the resources expended to reach deci-
sions. We are ultimately interested in discovering the incentive scheme that
minimizes the sum of the cost of errors plus the cost of operating the decision
system. (Consequently, the optimum scheme is one that normally permits a
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nonzero error rate.) Given the great uncertainties that attend the quantitative
assessment required, Professor Mashaw's ambivalence on the question of liabil-
ity versus immunity strikes me as sensible.
B. The Effects of Official Liability
I would now like to take the argument a step further by ignoring all of the
errors that a bureau is likely to make in specifying D, 0, andf. Suppose, more
specifically, either that these characterizations are free of error or that, within
very broad bounds, no court will hold a bureau liable for specification errors
that do occur.
Now let us consider the kind of problem that I worked on many years ago
as an employee of the Biometrical Services Staff, Farm Research Center, U.S.
Department of Agriculture. We were asked to construct a scheme to test vari-
ous features of veterinary biologics. The obligation of the USDA for safety in
veterinary biologics differs from that of the Food and Drug Administration for
human biologics in two respects that are relevant here. First, the USDA is not
required to test every lot of a drug but may sample various lots of a produc-
tion run. Second, though not required to be as comprehensive as the FDA,
the USDA has high testing costs. In particular, the USDA is often required to
use dogs, cattle, or horses as test animals, and the per unit cost of each test is
therefore high.
To simplify, suppose that D and 0 are defined as follows:
D = [approve production run for marketing, ban production run
from market]
0 = [A0 < )u -- 1, A is potency level]
The decision rulef is
approve if p .8
ban if < .8
The technical problem was to design a sampling scheme by which to estimate
p. for a given product and production process.
Consider the family of sampling schemes identified by three parameters
[a, /3, n]. The parameter n is the number of tests performed. If the per-unit
cost of a test is C, and the maximum budget allowed to test any given product is
B, then n < B/C. The parameters a and /3 are the probabilities of making
either of two errors of inference in testing the hypothesis
Ho: p. < .8
a is the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true; /3 is the probability of
accepting H0 when it is false. Both a and /3 are dependent upon n, since the
probability of error falls with an increase in the number of tests. If a(n) and
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/3(n) represent the probabilities of error in a decision based on n tests, then
a(n) -- a(n + 1) and /3(n) -- 3(n + 1). The a priori probability that a decisionf(p)
is in error, E(n) = a(n)+3(n), thus falls as n increases. But because of a fairly
low fixed budget B and a fairly high per-unit cost C, the constraint on n is
binding at a and /3 levels neither of which is trivial. Moreover, for a fixed n
one can decrease the probability of either error only so far before causing an
increase in the probability of the other. This limitation is illustrated by the
figure below, in which the shaded area represents combined probabilities
lower than n tests can achieve. The area above this represents probability
pairs that can be achieved with n tests; and its edge, line ab, represents the
lowest possible value of either probability for a given value of the other. Prob-
ability pairs on the ab boundary dominate those above it, since at least one
boundary pair will be lower in both types of error than any pair above the
boundary. But since any pair on the boundary will be lower than any other in
its probability of one type of error, the optimal decision scheme is not deter-
mined by this graph alone. One's choice of decision scheme will depend on
one's preference between the two possible errors. If one finds them equally
undesirable and wishes to reduce only the total probability of error, then the
point whose coordinates' sum is lowest will correspond to the optimal scheme.
But if one has a preference-say because one is a producer of biologics, a
consumer of biologics, or a USDA official whose liability for the two errors is
in practice unequal-then a different scheme may be optimal. For example,
since/3 represents the probability of erroneously banning a product, a consumer
might favor a decision scheme whose error probabilities fall closer to point b,
even though those probabilities yield a higher total probability of error than
those at point a. Of course, this is only one of numerous interests that would
affect one's choice; and in the end the government officers' preferences will
probably prevail.
This particular illustration may not be very useful for an assessment of
civil liability for government officers, since, as Mashaw indicates, there may be
some doubt about legal causation in this case. I chose it, however, because it
involves a government decision that has a scientific basis, is statistical in na-
ture, and for which it seems reasonable to assume that D, 0, and f are rela-
tively well specified. It therefore permits me to assert in the strongest form
the following proposition: In the most propitious decisionmaking environ-
ment the probability of bureaucratic error is high. Even for those bureaus
that make only infrequent decisions the probability of erroneous decisions is
high, and as the frequency of decisionmaking increases, the probability that
errors will be made approaches unity.
The question remains whether behavioral adjustments in bureau de-
cisionmaking under the threat of civil liability would change this conclusion. I
shall first suggest that the threat is quite credible; which in turn permits me to
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ERROR CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS DECISION SCHEMES
0 1
Discussion: This graph represents the paired probabilities of erroneously accepting and er-
roneously rejecting the hypothesis Ho on the basis of n tests. In a fixed number of tests these
probabilities are interdependent: they can be simultaneously reduced as far as the line ab but no
farther; thereafter either one can be reduced only if the other is raised. The shaded area thus
represents reductions in both probabilities that cannot be achieved in n tests. The unshaded area
above the line represents probability pairs that can be bettered in both terms, at least by one pair
on the boundary ab. But no pair on ab can better any other pair on ab in both terms. The optimal
decision scheme thus corresponds to one of the pairs of error probabilities on ab; but which pair
it corresponds to depends on one's preference in the tradeoff between erroneous acceptance and
erroneous rejection of Ho.
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argue that even very credible threats will not have major behavioral effects.6
It is important to note first that the effect, if not the intent, of bureaucra-
tic decisionmaking is not to discover the public interest but to resolve conflicts
among competing interests. With every decision there are winners and losers.
In light of the relatively high probability of error a loser (or potential
loser)--especially one interested in numerous decisions-may rationally invest
resources in a capability to contest allegedly erroneous decisions.7 Even in the
absence of civil liability this may be rational: a reversal or a rehearing pro-
duces expected economic benefits to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of
compensation for damages or foregone opportunities. With the prospect of
compensation as well, the incentive to contest would be even stronger.
The question still remains what behavioral adjustments civil liability would
cause on the part of a government bureau. If a bureau's decision scheme is
already on its ab frontier, its response to the added threat of liability will take
one of four forms;
1. Do nothing: If a bureau's decision scheme is on its ab frontier, there
may be no compelling reasons to change its decisionmaking procedures, espe-
cially if changes require substantial additional resources.
2. Move to another point on the ab frontier: As suggested above, a
bureau may respond by moving along its ab frontier. By doing so, the bureau
purchases protection against errors harming one set of interests at the cost of
an increased likelihood of harming some other set of interests. Movement
along the frontier, I suspect, will be responsive to those interests that are most
likely to seek compensation for erroneous decisions, e.g., producer interests.8
To the extent that class actions are permitted or that public-interest groups
have standing, this response will be somewhat blunted.
3. Shift the ab frontier: A parallel shift in the ab frontier represents an
improvement in decisionmaking, i.e., a decline in the probability of error.
6. And the chief effect, at that, will be a response to aggrieved parties who are in the best
position to engage in civil actions, viz., concentrated, organized interests, which need not be dis-
tinguished by an), economic criteria.
7. For example, producers of veterinary biologics engage in extensive testing of their own.
Their tests, as characterized by a(n), [3(n), and n, may differ from the government's. It is often in
their interest to spend more on testing than the government; hence their n is often larger. It may
also be in their interest to choose a testing scheme-and a corresponding point on the ab
frontier-more advantageous to their cause than the government's testing scheme, though not
actually invalid. The results of these tests will provide the grounds (if there are any) for a claim
of erroneous decision. In addition, one should expect to see producers purchasing the services of
government scientists and science administrators (as opposed to, or in addition to, higher-level
policymakers), not so much for their scientific expertise as for their detailed knowledge of gov-
ernment decisionmaking procedures and the possible sources of error therein.
8. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION (1965) (argues that such interests are
effective in organizing themselves to produce public goods); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 3 (1971) (argues that such interests are effective in
organizing themselves to "capture" regulatory agencies).
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There are (at least) three possibilities to consider: (i) a decrease in the per-unit
decision cost C under a fixed decisionmaking technology and fixed budget, (ii)
an increase in the decision budget B, and (iii) an improvement in the technol-
ogy of decisionmaking.
To the extent that civil liability encourages parallel shifts in the ab frontier
via (i), its salutary effect is clear. Since n _- B/C, and since a(n) _> a(n + 1) and
/3(n) - )3(n + 1), a decrease in C causes an increase in n, which in turn causes a
decrease in both a and /3. A decline in per-unit decision costs, that is, permits
decision resources to be used more productively; both types of error will de-
cline accordingly. Precisely the same conclusion follows from (ii), an increase
in the decision budget B. Again, to the extent that civil liability encourages an
increase in B, it will also reduce both types of error. The desirability of this
effect, however, is more controversial, since additional resources, in the form
of a larger bureau budget, are required. While there will be more care, it may
not be more efficient in the sense of either productive efficiency or allocative
efficiency. Holding the budget fixed, as in (i), encourages a bureau to stretch
its budget in response to liability; expanding the budget does not encourage
productive efficiencies. Moreover, it is entirely possible for the budget expan-
sion to exceed the economic value of a reduction in erroneous decisions; that
is, a larger budget need not be allocatively efficient. Finally, via (iii), an im-
provement in the technology of decisionmaking will shift the ab frontier in a
southwesterly direction. Actually, (i) may be regarded as a special case of (iii).
I treat (iii) separately because research and development costs may loom espe-
cially large here. Thus, as in (ii), the economic gain from more error-free
decisionmaking may not justify the necessary costs.
4. Purchase liability insurance: If this option is open to a bureau, then
the only effect of civil liability will be to compensate victims, unless the sellers
of insurance base their rates on the probability of error in the insured de-
cisionmaking scheme. If insurance rates are tied to a(n) and /3(n), then there
may be some incentive for bureaus to adopt some form of (2) or (3) above.
The four possible responses listed above are based on the assumption that
a bureau's decisionmaking scheme is already on the ab frontier. If the
bureau's decision scheme is not on the ab frontier, prior to the imposition of
liability (say, at point c in the figure), 9 then the new standard of accountability
would push it toward that frontier.
9. This could occur for a variety of reasons. As W. A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REP-
RESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) and others have noted, bureaus only weakly monitored by a
sponsoring agency (e.g., a legislature) need not accomplish their appointed tasks efficiently. For
example, point c in the figure might represent a decision scheme largely determined by the
interests of the legislative district of a powerful committee chairman. This example is not purely
hypothetical: Some years ago the Congress restricted the Department of Agriculture in its place-
ment of new testing laboratories to locations at least fifty miles from Washington. Had it not been
so restricted, USDA probably would have continued to place those laboratories in its research
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CONCLUSION
Although this commentary has been somewhat labored, and the illustra-
tion quite artificial, several conclusions are justified:
1. Errors of specification and inference are nontrivial in the best of cir-
cumstances. They are especially problematical when decisionmaking technol-
ogy is crude.
2. In order to assess the utility of a liability system, it is necessary to com-
prehend the various ways decision errors may occur and to consider the be-
havioral responses a particular system of incentives can be expected to en-
courage.
3. A system of civil liability for government officers may have no effect,
perverse effects, or desirable effects. The First Law of Social Science applies:
Sometimes it's this way, sometimes it's that way. A liability system that encour-
ages a southwesterly shift in the ab frontier ° through production economies is
socially beneficial. A liability system that encourages a shift in the ab frontier
through the expenditure of additional resources, or that encourages move-
ment along a fixed frontier, may be socially wasteful or otherwise undesirable
on distributional grounds. It would appear, then, that the main (and perhaps
only) desirable effect of civil liability is the incentive for productive efficiency.
4. Mashaw suggests that civil liability is likely to vary in its effects by gov-
ernmental function." He expects that functions not easily monitored by tradi-
tional mechanisms of control and oversight, e.g., decentralized functions,
"would ...be particularly strong candidates for the introduction of civil liabil-
ity. ' ' t 2 On the basis of the argument developed above I would modify
Mashaw's suggestion slightly. It is not so much by the characteristics of gov-
ernment functions that the desirability of civil liability varies; rather it is ac-
cording to the kinds of errors that a decision process produces. Whether the
kind and rate of errors are highly correlated with functional characteristics is
hard to determine.
complex in Beltsville, Maryland, some twenty miles from Washington, where various economies
of scale prevailed. The restriction on USDA discretion was the product of a successful political
maneuver by southern and midwestern Congressmen on the Senate and House Agriculture
Committees who "seen their opportunities for pork and took 'em!"
10. or its analogue in more complicated decisions.
11. Mashaw, supra note 2, at 33.
12. Id. at 33.
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